Research

PhD thesis: Financial Logic and Power Dynamics: Political Economy of the World Bank

This study uses the political economy analytical framework to examine how the World Bank financing model and constraints shape the bargaining power of its major shareholders and borrower countries, which further affects the loan allocation and loan conditionalities design of the Bank.

Working Papers

Reviving Chinese Development Finance in the Global South, co-authored with Rebecca Ray, Kevin P. Gallagher, Marina Zucker Marques, and Yan Liang, Boston University Global Development Policy Center working paper, Oct 2025

Divergent Incentives, Currency Mismatch, and Usage Restrictions: How China Manages the PBOC Bilateral Swap Lines and Why They Differ from a Traditional International Lender of Last Resort, 2025

Major Donors, World Bank, and Premier Borrowers: The Political Economy of the World Bank Loan Allocation, 2023

The Bargaining Power of Borrower Countries and the World Bank Loan Conditionality, 2024

Political Economy of World Bank Loan Conditions of Fiscal and Debt Reform, 2024